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of a Game and Its Information Structure* 
H. S. WITSENHAUSEN 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974 
In deterministic zero-sum two-person games, the upper and lower values 
move towards each other as the information available to the players is in- 
creased. This basic fact still holds, with appropriate interpretation, even 
when the closed loop equations fail to have a unique solution for all pairs of 
strategies, a hypothesis that would at times be overly restrictive. 
In particular, if a saddle-point exists for some information pattern, then it 
remains a saddle-point when the information available is increased. In that 
case, the additional information can only enable aplayer to come closer to the 
ideal of permanent optimality. 
These results, though, fail to hold in an essential way when the game is 
stochastic. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the theory of differential games, Berkovitz (1964) introduced the assump- 
tion that for a given pair of strategies there exists a unique solution of the 
equations describing the game. The work of Varaya and Lin (1969) clearly 
shows that this assumption may sometimes be dispensed with. Some of 
the basic inequalities relating values and information structure for deter- 
ministic zerosum two-person games are given here for the case of multiple 
solutions. To some extent he absence of any solution is also tolerated. 
The setting is chosen to display just those features of the extensive form 
of a game that are relevant for the present purpose. Tho this end, the notion 
of feedbach game is introduced. Heuristically, it can be viewed as follows. 
The players, through their various agents and at various times, apply inputs 
to a deterministic system. The history of all inputs applied at the behest of 
the minimizing player is denoted by u and the set of all possible histories 
is denoted by U. Likewise, V is the input set for the maximizing player. 
* Based on an invited contribution to the Third Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences, Honolulu, Jan. 1970. 
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A pure strategy for the minimizing player consists of maps defining, for 
each agent, the dependence of the action to be taken upon the data (output) 
available to that agent. 
Since the system is deterministic, any output is a function of the pair (u, v). 
By composition of maps, a given strategy for the minimizing player is 
characterized by a function p :  U × V---~ U where p(u, v) is the input 
history that would result if this strategy is used and the input pair (u, v) 
is applied to the system. The set of all strategies for the minimizing player 
is some set P of such maps. Likewise, the maximizing player has a choice of 
strategies characterized by a set Q of maps q : U × V--~ V. 
Different information structures yield different sets P, Q. If, e.g., structure 2
gives the minimizing player "more" information than structure i, then one 
should have P1 C P2 because the additional information eed not be actually 
used, so that the strategies of structure 1 remain feasible. 
If a player receives no outputs from the system, then each of his strategies 
consists in the selection of a point in U (resp., V). The maps characterizing 
such "open-loop" strategies are members of the set of all constant functions 
from U × V into U (resp., V). This set plays a crucial role and is denoted 
Po (resp., Q0). 
The payoff K(u, v) is also determined by the input pair (u, v). Given a pair 
of strategies (p, q), one seeks solutions (u, v) of the equations u = p(u, v), 
v = q(u, v). Let W(p, q) denote the value(s) of K evaluated at the solution(s). 
Then P, Q, W define the normal ("matrix") form of the game. 
2. NOTATION 
In the sequel, A × B denotes the cartesian product of the sets .// and B, 
A 9 denotes the set of all functions mapping B into A, 2 A denotes the collection 
of all subsets of A. The set inclusion symbol C is understood to allow equality, 
so that A C A and ~ C A always hold? The operators up and inf map 2R~ 
into Re, where R e = [--0% +oo]  is the extended real line. One has 
sup ~ = -- o% because -- oo is the least element of R~ that is not exceeded 
by any element of the empty set. Likewise, inf ~ = + oo. Then A C B 
implies inf .// >/ inf  B, sup A ~< sup B whether or not empty sets occur. 
I f  for each b in the index set B, one has a set Ab C R , ,  then supb~ A~ will 
1 ~ denotes the empty set. 
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stand for supb~B sup Ab 
equivalent definition is 
and 
and, likewise, infbe 8Ab means infb~B infAb. An 
sup Ab = sup ~J As 
beB 
baB 
infAb = in fUAb.  
bEB 
b~B 
For subsets A, B of Re, the notation A ~< B shall mean that for all a in A, 
b in B the relation a ~< b holds. Then A ~< A holds if and only if A has less 
than two elements. When A <~ B, B <~ A, A =~ ~,  B ~ ~,  then A and B 
must be the same singleton set. 
3. DEFINITION OF FEEDBACK GAMES 
In this paper a feedback game is defined as a quintuple (U, V, P, Q, K)  
where U, V are nonempty sets K : U × V -+ R, P is a nonempty set of maps 
p : U × V--* U and Q is a nonempty set of maps q : U × V--* V. 
In the sequel, different choices of P C U vxv and Q c v Uxv for a fixed 
choice of U, V, K will be considered. 
Denote by P0 (resp. Qo) the set of all constant maps from' U × V into U 
(resp., V). 
Define a : U Uxv X V v×v-+ 2 vxv by 
and 
by 
, , (p,  q) = {(u, v) I " = p(u,  v),  v = q(u, ~)} 
W : U vxv × V vxv--+ 2 R 
W(p, q) = {K(u, v) I (u, v) ~ c,(p, q)}. 
(1) 
(2) 
A pair (p, q) ~ U Uxv × V Uxv is said to be playable 2 when e(p, q) is not 
empty and sharp when W(p, q) is a singleton. 
The pair (P, Q) is said to beplayable when every (p, q) e P × Q is playable. 
(P, ~) is sharp when every (p, q) ff P × Q is sharp. 
e This word thus has a broader meaning than in Berkovitz (1964). 
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Define 
t(-oo, +oo) 
W(P' q) = ~W(p, q) 
M(p, Q) = sup w(p, q), 
qcQ 
2VI(p, Q) = sup/~(p, q), 
qEQ 
L(P, q) ~- inf W(p, q), 
peP 
L(P, q) = inf l?/(p, q), 
pep 
/z(P, Q) = inf M(p, Q), 
peP 
/2(P, O) = inf 37/(p, O), 
pep 
A(P, Q) = sup L(P, q), 
qeQ 
,~(P, Q) = supL(P, q). 
qEQ 
for W(p, q)= 2~, 
otherwise (2') 
(3) 
(3') 
(4) 
(4') 
(S) 
(S3 
(6) 
(6') 
(P, Q) is weakly playable when A(P, Q) ~/z(P, Q). 
A pair (p*, q*) is a weak saddle point in (P, O) when 
(i) (p*, q*) ~P  × Q 
(ii) (p*, q*) is playable 
(iii) for all p e P, q e Q, 
W(p*, q) <~ w(p*, q*) <~ w(p, q*) (7) 
A saddle point in (P, Q) is a weak saddle point (p*, q*) in (P, Q) which 
satisfies 
(ii') for all p e P, q ~ Q, the pairs 
(p*, q) and (p, q*) are playable. 
If p* eP  and (p*, q) is playable for all qEQ and if for all (p, q) in P × O 
one has W(p*, q) ~ W(p, q), thenp* is permanently optimal in (P, Q) for the 
minimizing player (Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). The definition of 
permanent optimality for the maximizing player is similar, mutatis mutandis. 
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4. I~ROPERTIES 
In this section some of the major facts concerning feedback games are 
stated precisely. The abbreviation a.m.m. (and mutatis mutandis) is used as 
the assertion of the dualized version of a statement, obtained by interchanging 
the roles of the players. 
Fact 1. L(P, q) ~ L(P, q) and }t(P, Q) ~ A(P, Q). a.m.m. 
Fact 2. ~(P, Q) <~ fi(P, Q). 
Fact 3. If (P, Q) is playable, then it is weakly playable. 
Fact 4. If (p*, q*) is a saddlepoint in (P, Q), then (7) also holds with I7¢ - 
in place of W. 
Fact 5. Every weak saddlepoint (afortiori, every saddlepoint) is sharp. 
Fact 6. If (p*, q*) is a saddlepoint in (P,Q), then W(p*, q*)= {v}, 
where v = A(P, Q) = ~(P, Q) = t~(P, Q) = ~(P, Q). 
Fact 7. The set of all saddlepoints in (P, Q) is rectangular. That is, 
if (Pl, ql) and (pz, q~) are saddlepoints in (P, Q), then (Pl, q~) and (P2, q~) 
are also saddlepoints in (P, Q). 
Fact 8. If P~ C P~ C U vxv, then for all q e V U×v, L(P2, q) ~ L(P~, q). 
Furthermore, for any nonempty Q c V vxv, h(P2, Q) ~ A(P1, Q), and 
/z(P2, Q) ~</z(P1, Q). a.m.m. 
Fact 9. For all q ~ V vxv and all P C U vxv, one has 
U 4p, q) c U 4p, q), (8) 
~o~P ~oeP o
and equality holds if Po C P. a.m.m. 
Fact 10. For all q E V vxv and all P C U v×V one has 
U w(p, q) c U w(p, q) 
~oeP ~Po 
and if Po C P equality holds, a.m.m. 
Fact 11. If PoCPCU vxv, then for all q~V vxv, L (P ,q ) :L (Po ,q )  
and for all nonempty Q C U v×v, h(P, Q) = h(Po , Q). a.m.m. 
Fact 12. I fQoCQ1CV vxv, Qo C Q~ C V vxv and P~ C Pz C U v×v, then 
/x(P2,95) ~/x(P~,Q1). a.m.m. 
Fact 13. If Po C P~ C P2 C U vxv, Qo C Q~ C Q2 C V v×v and (P~,Q2) 
is weakly playable, then (P1, Qa) is weakly playable. 
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Fact 14. If Po C P1 C Po. C U vxv and (/)2, Q) is weakly playable, then 
;~(P1, Q) = 1(P2, Q) ~/~(P2, Q) ~/x(P1, Q). a.m.m. 
Fact 15. If QoCQ~CQ2C V Uxv, PoCP, CPeC U Ux" and (P~ ,Q2) 
is weakly playable, then A(P,, Q~) ~ A(P2, ~2) ~/~(P2, Qe) ~/*(P~, ~l)- 
Fact 16. Assume (2o C ~, C Q2 C V U×v, Po C P, C P2 C g Uxv. If (p*, e*) 
is a weak saddle point in (P1, Q1), it is a weak saddle point in (P2, Q2) as well. 
If (p*, q*) is a saddle point in (1)1,01) and if ({p*}, Oe) and (P2, {q*}) are 
playable [in particular, if (P2, Q2) is playable], then (p*, q*) is a saddle point 
in (['2, Q2). 
Fact 17. If (P, Q) is weakly playable and p* is permanently optimal in 
(P,~) for the minimizing player then, for all q eQ, (p*, q) is sharp with 
W(p*, q) = {L(P, q)} and 2, =/ ,  = M(p*, ~). a.m.m. 
Fact 18. If Po C/)1 C/)2 C U U×v, if (P2, Q) is weakly playable and if p* 
is permanetly optimal for the minimizing player in (1)1, Q), then it is perma- 
nently optimal in (P2, ~). a.m.m. 
Fact 19. If (2o C O C V Uxv, if (P, (2o) is playable, if (p*, q*) is a saddle- 
point in (P, O) and if p* is permanently optimal in (P, 0), then there exists 
q0 CQo such that (p*, %) is also a saddle-point in (P, O). a.m.m. 
5. INTERPRETATION IN TERMS OF INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
The assumption P0 C P, Q0 C Q means that all open-loop strategies are 
possible and is quite natural. The assumption that all pairs of strategy sets 
to be considered are weakly playable is reasonable. 
Then some of the results can be phrased informally as follows: 
# An increase of information to the minimizing player leaves the lower 
value unchanged and can only decrease the upper value. 
# An increase of information to the maximizing player leaves the upper 
value unchanged and can only increase the lower value. 
# If a saddle value exists, this fact and the numerical value remain 
unchanged as the information available to either or both players is increased. 
# A saddle point pair of strategies remains a (possibly weak) saddle point 
as the information available to either or both players is increased. 
# If a player has a permanently optimal strategy, that strategy remains 
permanently optimal as the information available to that player is increased. 
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Though these facts are (or should be) well known, they are established here 
without using any of the following assumptions: 
(i) for each pair of strategies a solution exists; 
(ii) the solution is unique; 
(iii) the system and the strategies are nonanticipative; 
(iv) conditions on the cardinality, the topological structure or the 
measure-theoretic structure of any of the sets involved. 
6. STOCHASTIC GAMES 
The formal definition of a stochastic feedback game is in terms of the 
octuple (U, V, f2, 27, i~, P, Q, K), where U, V are nonempty sets ,(f2, 27, t*) 
is a probability space. P is a nonempty set of maps p : U × V X f2--+ U 
and Q is a nonempty set of maps q : U × V × D --* V. K is a real function 
onUx V×~.  
Assume that for all co ~g? and all (p, q) in P × Q, the simultaneous 
equations u = p(u, v, o J), v = q(u, v, ~o) are satisfied by exactly one pair 
(u, v) = ~(p, q, ~o) in U x V. 
Define W(p, q, oo) = K(~(p, q, co)). Assume that for all (p, q) in P x Q 
the function W(p, q, "") is integrable on (~2, ~,/z).  
Define W(p, q) = E~{W(p, q, co)). Then upper, lower and saddle values 
and saddle points can be defined as for the matrix game (P, Q, W), considering 
only pure strategies. 
Despite the above strong assumptions, many of the facts previously stated 
do not hold any more. The analog of Fact 8 remains valid because additional 
information can not be harmful, but the analog of Fact 15 fails for the 
following reason. The inclusion (8) is replaced by 
Vq, {g(p, q, ") ]p c P} C {~(p, q, .) [p ~ P~}, (9) 
where P~ is a set of functions from U x V X ~ into U all functionally 
independent of the first two arguments and Pe contains, for eachp ~ P, q ~ Q, 
the map which assigns to co the value of the first component u of u(p, q, ~o). 
The assumption P~ C P would then serve in place of P0 C P, but such 
an assumption is exceedingly implausible. 
Heuristically, in the deterministic ease the lower value corresponds to 
the minimizing player having advance knowledge of the strategy q of his 
opponent. With q known, the player is faced with a completely deterministic 
system. For such a system, feedback is useless, one can do as well with an open 
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loop strategy. Therefore, the lower value does not change as the information 
available to the minimizing player is increased. In the stochastic case, however, 
once the strategy q is known, the minimizing player is left facing a stochastic 
system. For such a system feedback usually permits improved performance. 
Thus the lower value can decrease as the information available to the mini- 
mizing player is increased. Consequently, when the information of both 
players is increased, the direction of change of the upper and lower values is 
not fixed a priori. 
APPENDIX 
Proofs of the Facts asserted are provided here. The one difficulty worth 
noting is that the implication Po C P ~ A(P, Q) = A(Po, Q) does not always 
hold when A is replaced by A, while, on the other hand, the relation ,~(P, O) 
~2(P, Q) does not always hold with A,/~ replaced by A, ~. 
Proofs 
Fact 1. By (2'), 
from which 
w(p, q) c w(p, q) 
U w(p, q) c U 
1oeP ~oeP 
Taking the infimum of these sets gives 
L(P, q) = inf [J w(p, q) >~ inf 0 lYV(p, q) = L(P, q) 
~o~P ~0eP 
and the supremum over q of this inequality gives 
A(P, Q) ~< A(P, Q)- 
Fact 2. By (2') p~r(p, q) is never empty, so that inf T/l/'(p, q) ~ sup l/V(p, q). 
Then for all p ~ P, q E Q 
L(p, q) = inf inf I?V(p ', q) ~< inf 17V(p, q) ~< sup l~(p, q). 
p 'sp  
Taking the supremum over q ~ Q gives 
X(P, Q) <~ /f/(p, Q) ~< sup .gI(p, Q) = #(P, Q). 
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Fact 3. If (P, Q) is playable, W and ~V are identical. Hence A(P, Q) = 
,~(P, O),/x(P, Q) = ¢(P, Q) and, by Fact 2, A(P, Q) ~/x(P, Q) showing (P, Q) 
to be weakly playable. 
Fact 4. All the pairs involved in (7) are playable by definition of a saddle 
point and on playable pairs W and I/V coincide. 
Fact 5. In (7) let p = p* to obtain W(p*, q*) <~ W(p*, q*), implying 
card W(p*, q*) ~< 1. But (p*, q*) is playable by definition of a weak saddle 
point so that card W(p*, q*) > O. 
Fact 6. By Fact 5, W(p*, q*) is a singleton {v}. By definition of a saddle 
point the set W(p*, q) is nonempty for all q in Q. The inclusion 
W(p*, q) C U W(p, q) 
holds. Hence 
L(P, q) ~ inf QJ W(p, q) <~ inf W(p*, q) ~ v, 
~oaP 
the last inequality by (7). Taking the supremum over q e Q yields h(P, Q) ~ v. 
By Fact 4, for all q in Q, 
Thus 
{v} = w(p*, q*) = #(p*, q*) ~< Vt(p, q*). 
~(P, Q) = supL(P, q) >~ L(P, q*) = inf l?V(p, q*) >~ v. 
q~Q peP 
By Fact 1, one concludes A(P, Q) -- ~(P, Q) = v. A dual argument establishes 
/~(n, Q) =/2(P, Q) = v. 
Fact 7. To show that (Pl, q2) is a saddle point in (P, Q) first verify 
(ii'): (Pl, q) is playable because (ii') holds for (Pl, ql) and (p, q2) is playable 
because (ii') holds for (P2, q2). By Fact 6, W(pl, ql) = W(p~, q2) = {v}. 
Then (7) applied to (p~, q~) and (P2, q2) gives, for all p ~ P, q EQ, 
w(p~ , q) <~ {v} <~ w(p,  ql), 
w(p2 , q) <~ {~} ~< w(p, q2). 
These relations imply {v} ~< W(pl, qz) <~ {v}, and since (Pl, q2) is playable, 
W(pl, q2) = {v}. Together these relations give 
w(pl  , q) <~ w(p~ , q~) <~ W(p, q~) 
which is (7) for (p~, q2)- 
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Fact 8. 
and 
The inclusion P1 C P~ entails 
U w(p, q) c U w(p, q) 
PeP1 P~P2 
U q) c U e(p, q). 
PeP1 P~P2 
But even for possibly empty sets A C B implies inf B ~ inf A, so that the 
inequalities follow from (3)-(6'). 
Fact 9. If (u*, v*) E U~e a(p, q), then, for somep ~ P, (u*, v*) E a(p, q), 
i.e., u* = p(u*, v*), v* = q(u*, v*). Let P0 ~ Po be the constant function 
on U × V with value u*. Then u* =p0(u*,v*), v*= q(u*, v*), i.e., 
(u*, v*) c (r(p0, q) C ~po a(p, q), proving (8). If P0 C P, then the inclusion 
converse to (8) holds, implying equality. 
Fact 10. This is immediate from Fact 9 and the definition of W. Note that 
the assertion eed not always hold for l~z, because for some q (for instance, 
in Q0), all pairs (Po, q) with P0 ~ Po might be playable while (p, q) is not 
playable for some p ~ P. 
Fact 11. By Fact 10, for all q, 
U w(p,q) = U w(p,q) 
peP pEP 0 
from which 
L(P, q) = inf U W(p, q) = inf U w(p, q) = L(Po, q) 
peP looP 0 
and, taking the supremum over q ~ Q, A(P, Q) = A(Po, Q). 
Fact 12. By the dual of Fact 11,/~(P1, Q1) = p~(P1, Qo), and/~(P2, Q2) = 
/~(P2, Qo). By Fact 8,/z(P2, Qo) ~/Z(Pl, Qo). 
Fact 13. By assumption, A(P2, Q2) ~/~(P2, Q2). By Fact 12 and its dual, 
/~(P2, Q2) ~/~(P1, Qa) and A(P2, Q2) ~ A(P1, Q1). Hence )~(Pl, Q1) -~ 
/z(P1, Q0- 
Fact 14. By Fact 11, A(P~, Q)= A(Po, Q)~ A(P2,Q) and by Fact 8, 
/~(P2, Q) ~/~(P1, g). 
Fact 15. By Fact 11, A(P~,Q1)= A(Po,Q1)= A(P2,Q1). By the dual 
of Fact 8, A(P2, Q1) ~ A(P2, Q2). By the definition of "weakly playable", 
A(P2, Q2) ~/-~(P2, Q2)- By Fact 8, /-~(P2, Q2) ~/~(P1, Q2). By the dual of 
Fact 11,/~(P1, Q2) =/~(P1, Qo) =/~(Pl, Q~). 
643/x9 /3 -3  
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Fact 16. With (p*, q*) a saddle point in (P1, Q1), condition (7) can be 
written L(P1, q*) = M(p*, Qa). But by Fact 11, L(P1, q*) =L(P0,  q*) = 
L(P2, q*) and by its dual m(p* , Q1) = M(p*, Qo) = M(p*, Q2). Hence 
L(P2, q*) = M(p*, Q2) which shows that (p*, q*) is also a weak saddle 
point in (P2, Q2). Now if ({p*}, Q2) and (P.2, {q*}) are playable, then W 
and I~, L and L, M and 37/agree at all points involved. Then the relation 
L(P2, q*) = M(p*, Q2) implies that (p*, q*) is a saddle point in (/'2, Qe). 
Fact 17. By assumption, ({p*}, Q) is playable and, for all p ~ P, q ~ Q, 
W(p*, q) ~ W(p, q). (10) 
Letting p =p*  gives W(p*, q)<~ W(p*, q) which shows that (p*, q) is 
sharp. Taking the infimum over p ~ P gives W(p*, q) <~ {L(P, q)} and 
p* ~ P implies equality. Taking the suprernum over q ~ Q gives M(p*, Q) <~ 
M(p,Q) which shows that ~ =M(p*  ,Q). One has W(p*, q)= 
{L(P, q)} ~< {A}, taking the supremum over q ~ Q gives M(p*, Q) ~< A whence 
/~ ~< A, and since (P, Q) is weakly playable, equality holds. 
Fact 18. By assumption, for each q e Q, the sharp value of W(p*, q) is 
the minimum of the set U~e, 1 W(p, q). To see that this remains true with 
P1 replaced by P2, one need only observe that, by virtue of Fact 10, 
U w(p, q) = U w(p, = U w(p, q). 
ko~P 2 ~o~P o ~o~P 1
Fact 19. Let (u*, v*) be an element of the nonempty set a(p*, q*). Let 
qo eQ0 be the constant function with value v*. Then ({p*}, Q) is playable by 
the assumptions on (p*, q*) and (P, {q0}) is playable because of the assump- 
tion on (P, Q0). For allp E P, W(p*, qo) <~ W(p, qo) by permanent optimality 
of p*. For all q ~ Q, W(p*, q) ~ W(p*, q*) by (7). By construction of q0, 
a(p*, qo) and a(p*, q*) have a common element. Therefore, W(p*, qo) 
and W(p*, q*) must meet, and since, by Fact 17, they are both singletons, 
they must coincide W(p*, qo) = W(p*, q*). Together these relations imply 
that (7) holds for (p*, q0) which thus satisfies all requirements for a saddle 
point in (P, O). 
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